Threat Modeling a Real Application

Every previous project in this roadmap taught one technique in isolation, on a deliberately small example system. Real threat models don't run one technique at a time — they weave scoping, diagramming, STRIDE, attack trees, and risk scoring together into a single process, because each technique's output feeds the next one's input. That's what this project does, against a real application instead of a toy checkout flow.

Pick your target now, before reading further: your own project (ideal, since you already understand it deeply) or a well-documented open-source application whose architecture you can research from its own docs, README, and architecture diagrams. Keep the scope achievable — a single service or a tightly bounded feature (a login system, a file upload feature, an API) rather than an entire sprawling platform. A focused, complete threat model of one component beats a shallow, half-finished pass at an entire system.